Logo Daily Crypto Briefs
Open menu

Dune Says Idle DeFi Liquidity Leaves $150M in Fees on the Table

7 min read
Breaking News
Official Dune icon and wordmark on a prominent white analysis plaque beside an out-of-range liquidity rail, representing Dune's study of idle DeFi liquidity.

TL;DR

  • Dune found that about 29.5% of the concentrated liquidity it studied, or roughly $542 million in an average week, sat outside its active fee-earning range.
  • On Dune's broader measure, around 85% of v3-family liquidity was underutilized once capital that remained in range but was not touched by trades was included.
  • The study estimated roughly $150 million of annual fees forgone by idle liquidity providers, but said that figure is not extra fee revenue the market could create all at once.
  • Uniswap v4 averaged 30.5% out-of-range liquidity in the study, showing that its new pool architecture has not by itself solved the repositioning problem.

NEW YORK, July 16, 2026

Dune said about $542 million of concentrated liquidity on major decentralized exchanges sat outside its fee-earning range in an average week during the first half of 2026, a condition the onchain-data firm estimated left individual liquidity providers forgoing roughly $150 million a year in fees.

The July 16 study, prepared by Dune for 1inch, reconstructed positions across active pools on Uniswap v3, Uniswap v4, PancakeSwap v3 and Aerodrome Slipstream. It separates capital that was fully out of range from capital that technically remained in range but was not reached by trades, an important distinction for anyone treating total value locked as a measure of executable depth.

Across 26 weekly snapshots from Jan. 6 through June 30, Dune measured about $1.84 billion of liquidity on average. It found 29.5% of that amount, or roughly $542 million, outside active ranges, while its broader test put 85% of v3-family capital in an underutilized state. More than a third of the out-of-range amount, about $200 million, had not been adjusted in 90 days.

Dune said the study rebuilt about 6.5 million position snapshots and reconciled the reconstructed balances to onchain data at roughly 97% by value for Uniswap, PancakeSwap and Aerodrome. Research lead Filippo Armani wrote that concentrated liquidity improved on older pool designs, but that a large share still “does not sit where trades happen.”

Ether, a key asset in the pools Dune used as a market-move reference, closed July 16 near $1,863.51 after closing June 18 near $1,711.22, according to CoinCodex historical data. The change in a market price is not a direct measure of Dune’s dataset, but one-way moves are central to how a fixed liquidity range becomes inactive.

Ethereum

ETH
June 18 to July 17, 2026
$1,864
+8.9%
Jun 18 - Jul 17 | High $1,864 Low $1,711

Dune Finds $542M Outside Active Liquidity Ranges

Concentrated liquidity lets a provider choose the price band where its assets will be available for swaps. That design was intended to keep more capital near the market price than an older constant-product pool, which spreads liquidity across every possible price.

When the market moves beyond a chosen band, however, the position is out of range. It no longer adds usable depth or collects swap fees unless the price returns or the owner moves the range. Dune called that the strictest measure of idle capital, and said the out-of-range share stayed mostly between 25% and 35% across its six-month sample, with an early-February peak near 41%.

The broader 85% result should not be read as 85% of all DeFi capital being abandoned. It includes 56.9% of v3-family liquidity that remained nominally in range but was not touched by a week’s trades, plus 29.4% that was out of range. Only 13.7% was actively used under Dune’s reconstruction of the methodology described in 1inch’s Aqua paper.

That makes the report useful beyond the headline figure. A pool can display a large deposit balance yet provide limited depth at the price where a trader needs to execute. For a participant comparing liquidity venues, the distance between total value locked and active liquidity can determine price impact more directly than a pool’s headline size.

The finding also adds context to the fee debate in Uniswap’s recent v4 governance proposals. Those proposals focus on how a share of swap fees could be directed to protocol revenue and UNI burns. Dune’s work addresses a separate starting point: how much deposited capital is actually in a position to earn the liquidity-provider portion of those fees.

Uniswap v4 Has Not Eliminated Idle Liquidity

Dune found Uniswap v4’s top 200 pools held about $230 million at the end of June and averaged 30.5% out of range, close to the v3-family results. Version four changes the underlying architecture by using a shared contract and allowing pools to attach custom hooks, but it retains the tick-based ranges that make a position active or inactive.

The hooks are relevant because they could, in principle, route assets that are waiting outside their range into a lending market such as Aave or Morpho. That could let capital earn a different return while it is unavailable for swaps. Dune said none of the hooked pools it examined used a rehypothecation or external-yield hook; the hooks it observed left assets in the pool while changing swap logic, fees or accounting.

The study did not establish that every inactive position is a mistake. Some LPs deliberately place a range away from the current price as a standing limit order, while others use automation to recenter positions. Dune found that 43.8% of out-of-range capital had been touched within 30 days, evidence that some of it was being actively managed rather than forgotten.

Still, the ownership data pointed to a difference between automated and individually held positions. On Ethereum, wallets held 91% of Uniswap v3 capital and 94 cents of each idle dollar in Dune’s analysis. On Base, contracts held about half the Uniswap v3 capital but only 6.5% of that contract-held amount was out of range, compared with roughly 30% for wallet-held liquidity.

The pattern helps explain why managed strategies are becoming more visible. Gauntlet’s institutional DeFi-vault expansion is a different product story, but it reflects the same demand for rules-based management, risk controls and continuous position monitoring rather than a one-time deposit. Those systems add smart-contract, execution and management risks of their own, so a lower idle rate is not by itself a verdict on their suitability.

$150M Estimate Is Not New Fee Revenue for Every LP

Dune estimated that out-of-range liquidity providers forwent roughly $150 million in annual fees. It calculated the result by applying the annualized fee rate earned by in-range liquidity, about 35 cents per dollar over the period, to the idle capital measured on Uniswap and PancakeSwap, then bounding an additional estimate for Aerodrome’s dynamic-fee pools.

The firm put about $116 million of the estimate on Uniswap, $25 million on PancakeSwap and roughly $6 million to $12 million on Aerodrome. It excluded Uniswap v4 because its dynamic fees could not be evaluated with the same fixed-tier method. Those are modeled results, not a transfer of cash Dune identified in a wallet.

Most importantly, Dune said the $150 million is not additive. Swap fees come from trading activity, not from the amount of liquidity deposited. If every idle provider shifted into range simultaneously, more positions would compete for the same fee pool and the yield earned by each active dollar would fall.

The report’s stronger conclusion is about market structure. Dune found that the idle share rose with the size of a weekly price move, while frequent small moves alone were less important. In a steady one-way market, ranges can be left behind just as traders need depth, while an equally volatile move that returns to its starting point can leave more positions active.

That tension matters for tokenized assets and other institutional uses of decentralized exchanges. The BUIDL trading route through UniswapX showed how traditional products can reach onchain liquidity through a controlled request-for-quote flow. Dune’s data suggests that the quality and placement of that liquidity remain as important as the size of the balances displayed on a protocol.

Market sentiment was still cautious around the publication. The Crypto Fear and Greed Index read 27, or Fear, on July 17, a broad-market reading that does not measure demand for any specific DEX pool.

Fear & Greed Index

July 17, 2026
27 Fear

The next evidence to watch is whether new v4 hooks, managed vaults or incentive designs reduce the out-of-range share without simply shifting risk elsewhere. Dune’s current conclusion is narrower: concentrated liquidity has improved on older automated-market-maker designs, but deposited capital and usable trading liquidity are still far from the same thing.

Stay up to date

Get the latest crypto insights delivered to your inbox

Fact-checked by: Daily Crypto Briefs Fact-Check Desk

Frequently Asked Questions

What did Dune find about idle DeFi liquidity?

Dune found that 29.5% of the concentrated liquidity it measured was outside its active fee-earning range in an average week. On a broader measure that also counts in-range capital not reached by trades, roughly 85% of v3-family liquidity was underutilized.

How much idle DeFi liquidity did the Dune study measure?

The study tracked about $1.84 billion in average weekly liquidity across roughly 200 active pools on Uniswap v3, Uniswap v4, PancakeSwap v3 and Aerodrome Slipstream. About $542 million was out of range in an average week.

Does Dune's $150 million estimate mean DeFi can create $150 million more in fees?

No. Dune said the estimate measures the fees an individual idle liquidity provider would have collected if it alone had repositioned while everyone else stayed put. Moving all idle capital into range would divide the existing trading-fee pool among more liquidity.

Did Uniswap v4 solve the idle-liquidity problem?

Not in Dune's sample. Uniswap v4 averaged 30.5% out-of-range liquidity, close to v3 levels. Dune said its hooks could eventually put parked assets to work, but none of the hooked pools it measured did so.

Why does concentrated liquidity go out of range?

Liquidity providers choose a price range in which their assets earn trading fees. If the market price moves beyond that range, the position no longer earns swap fees until the price returns or the provider repositions it.